There are many ways to forecast the future rate of infl ation, ranging from sophisticated statistical models involving hundreds of variables to hunches based on past experience. We generate a number of forecasts using a simple statistical model and an even simpler estimating rule, adding in various measures thought to be helpful in predicting the course of infl ation. Then we compare their forecast accuracy. We fi nd that no single specifi cation outperforms all others over all time periods. For example, the median and 16 percent trimmed-mean measures outperform all other specifi cations during the 1990s, and survey-based infl ation expectations seem to do better during volatile periods.
Just about everybody pays attention to infl ation and wonders when prices are going up, and by how much. Households and businesses need estimates of future prices to make well-informed decisions. Policymakers, whose job is to aid in those decisions by promoting stable prices, need accurate forecasts in order to monitor infl ation and make course corrections when necessary.
To get a glimpse into the probable future, one can use a statistical model. In this Commentary, we investigate a few simple versions of these to forecast Consumer Price Index (CPI) infl ation, along with some even-simpler rules of thumb. We start with univariate forecasting techniques. Then, in an effort to improve these forecasts, we investigate the forecasting properties of other variables that are thought to affect infl ation-economic slack, underlying infl ation, and survey measures of expected infl ation. We compare the forecast accuracy of a number of different specifi cations with variants of all of these.
We fi nd that there isn't just one dominant specifi cation that outperforms all other forecast models in every time period. Also, over the past ten years, simple statistics-such as annual infl ation rates in alternative price-change measures and infl ation expectations obtained from surveys-turn out to be more informative than the statistical models we tested.
A Starting Point
Infl ation tends to be a relatively persistent process, which means that current and past values should be helpful in forecasting future infl ation. Applying that intuition, we construct two basic models that exploit information embedded in past values of CPI infl ation. Each uses a different technique to forecast CPI infl ation over the year ahead: One is based on regression analysis and the other is based on the naïve specifi cation made popular by Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) . Later, we add and switch out different variables and different ways of measuring these variables to get other specifi cations.
The fi rst specifi cation is a regression that forecasts one-yearahead CPI infl ation using lags of the CPI (specifi cally, past values of the quarterly annualized percent change in the CPI).
1 We estimate this regression in a recursive manner, starting with a sample that includes 40 quarters of data and adds an additional data point to the sample in each successive quarter.
2 This approach is equivalent to saying that the next year's infl ation is a function of all past values of infl ation up to 4 quarters before. The regression analysis fi gures out the parameters of that function. Notes: For simplicity, we report only the root mean squared errors (RMSEs) from the highest-performing economic activity specifi cation, given that the relative performance of this set of variables diminished after the 1980s. The specifi cation with the lowest RMSE in each time period is highlighted in green.
The second specifi cation forecasts one-year-ahead CPI infl ation using a naïve specifi cation, in which the forecast over the year ahead is simply the past four-quarter growth rate in the CPI. For example, the four-quarter growth rate in the CPI stands at 1.2 percent through the third quarter of 2010. Using the naïve technique, 1.2 percent becomes our forecast for infl ation over the next four quarters (through the third quarter of 2011). This approach is equivalent to saying that infl ation over the upcoming year is most likely to be what it was in the past year up to that point.
Because it is possible that the underlying infl ation process has changed over time, we test the forecasting performance of these models over a variety of time periods. We fi rst examine forecast accuracy by decade, starting in 1960. Next, since monetary policy changed in the 1980s, we break the data series into two time periods, one pre-1983 and one post-1983. The infl ation process may have been altered following a period of disinfl ation in the early to mid-1980s-commonly referred to as the "Volcker-era" disinfl ation-after which both infl ation and infl ation expectations became less volatile. We also break out the 1984 To compare the accuracy of these specifi cations, we compute the root mean squared error (RMSE) statistic, a measure of forecast error, for each. A RMSE of 0 indicates a perfect forecasting performance, and positive values refl ect deviations between the forecasted values and the realized values. The higher the RMSE, the higher the deviation between the forecasted values and the realized values on average. Table 1 reports the forecast accuracy for our backward-looking regression and naïve specifi cation.
There are a couple of patterns to note from table 1. First, neither model consistently outperforms the other across different time periods, although the naïve method definitely has the upper hand. Second, the forecasting performance of these specifi cations, which depend only on past infl ation, varies appreciably across different time periods and has deteriorated over the last four years.
The implication of this recent deterioration in forecasting performance is that infl ation seems to be explained to a lesser extent by past infl ation than it used to be. An explanation for that deterioration could be that the underlying infl ation process has changed. Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2007) suggest, for example, that infl ation has become less persistent. The loss of explanatory power by lagged infl ation could also be tied, in part, to the energy price shock in mid-2008. By the third quarter of 2008, the four-quarter growth rate in the CPI had jumped up to 5.3 percent (a 17-year high), only to fall below 0.0 percent a mere two quarters later. A dramatic swing like that had not been experienced in the recent past, and it probably contributed to a larger forecast error, since backward-looking measures could not have accounted for such extreme variation.
Can We Do Better?
We attempt to improve on the forecasts that depend only on past infl ation by incorporating three other types of information into the basic models. First, we add different measures of economic activity into the regression. 3 The approach is common, and this kind of specifi cation is sometimes referred to as a Phillips curve.
Second, we investigate measures of underlying or core infl ation (such as the median CPI), statistics which attempt to lessen some of the volatility in the headline CPI, thereby extracting a more precise infl ation trend.
Finally, we see if survey measures of infl ation expectations have any useful predictive content.
The measures of economic activity that we add are those that are thought to improve infl ation forecasts: real GDP, unemployment, industrial production, manufacturing production, and capacity utilization. Measures of economic activity are thought to be useful in forecasting infl ation, with the underlying pace of expansion, or robustness of growth putting pressure on prices. For example, when output is rising at a fast pace or the unemployment rate is relatively low, prices in general often rise, leading to higher rates of infl ation. Conversely, periods when growth is slow or the unemployment rate is high tend to be disinfl ationary.
One way to exploit this relationship when forecasting is to use "gaps"-or deviations from a trend-because they can indicate exceptional variation. Another is to look at growth rates, where faster growth rates tend to be associated with higher infl ation rates and vice versa. We use deviations from trend and growth rates of the economic variables in the regressions. 4 Measures of underlying infl ation may more accurately uncover trend infl ation than the headline measure, so they may be more useful in forecasting. In any given period there can be a substantial amount of noise in the overall CPI, which can arise from a myriad of issues including seasonal adjustment issues, measurement problems, and idiosyncratic price changes (such as excise tax increases). This noise can obscure the signal from past headline infl ation and may lead to poor forecasts. Economists and forecasters frequently try to eliminate that noise in an attempt to uncover the underlying infl ation trend, what is often called core infl ation.
We test three measures of core CPI infl ation in place of the past headline infl ation. The fi rst, and most common measure of underlying infl ation, the core CPI, is the CPI activity measures are the best predictors among the remaining alternatives we examine. This result may be related to the relatively high volatility of that time period and may suggest that the loss of predictive power was due to the relative stability of the economy over the past 30 years or so (up until recently).
Core Infl ation Measures. Generally, it appears that these measures of underlying infl ation are useful when forecasting infl ation. Moreover, it seems that the predictive ability of this set of specifi cations has improved recently relative to the techniques reported in table 1. During the 1980s the lowest RMSE is only 10 percent better than the specifi cations that just use past values of headline infl ation, while over the past 10 years the lowest RMSE is roughly 25 percent better. Moreover, just paying attention to less noisy measures of underlying infl ation, like the naïve forecasts from the four-quarter percent change in the median and 16 percent trimmed-mean CPI measures, tends to be more useful than a Phillips curve specifi cation that includes lagged infl ation and economic activity measures (except during the 1970s). Also, it looks as if the naïve specifi cations of this type generally outperform the forecasts stemming from the estimated regressions. (2007), we fi nd that survey measures of infl ation expectations tend to outperform other, more standard, infl ationforecasting specifi cations. The most striking result is the relative performance of the naïve forecast constructed with the median expectation from the University of Michigan's Survey of Consumers. Over the 1980s, it had a RMSE of 1.51, roughly 25 percent better than the next closest RMSE of 2.02, which belongs to the naïve forecast from the median CPI. We fi nd the timing of this superior performance particularly interesting, because it corresponds to the period during which the Fed started and pursued a strategy to reduce the rate of infl ation.
Infl ation Expectations. Similar to Ang, Bekaert, and Wei
Expectations measures might pick up on the 1980s disinfl ation better than other approaches because statistical models can't detect new directions that break with past relationships. Since statistical models exploit past relationships between variables, their forecasts are more persistent. At signifi cant infl ection points, these forecasts are persistently wrong, whereas individuals are free to use judgment to discern if those relationships have changed. In the early part of the 1980s, infl ation was running in the double digits, and the Federal Open Market Committee, with Chairman Volcker at the helm, increased the federal funds rate to, at one point, nearly 20 percent in order to tame infl ation. Individuals appear to have adjusted to the change in policy and started to expect lower, more stable infl ation. Statistical methods could not detect this policy change as quickly, leading to the better forecasting performance of expectations measures over that time period. minus food and energy. As the name implies, this measure excludes two of the most historically volatile componentsfood and energy prices. However, Bryan and Cecchetti (1993) argue that volatility (noise) can arise from any component during a given period (usually a month), and by trimming (or excluding) the most volatile monthly price changes, a clearer signal of underlying infl ation can be uncovered. Two such trimmed-mean statistics are the median CPI and the 16 percent trimmed-mean CPI, and we test these as well.
We incorporate the different measures of core infl ation into both of our model types. In the regression specifi cation, we use current and past values of the core infl ation measures as explanatory variables. 5 We create alternative naïve specifi cations by incorporating the trailing four-quarter percent change in each core infl ation measure.
Finally, we investigate two readily available survey measures of one-year-ahead infl ation expectations, the median expectation from the University of Michigan's Survey of Consumers (hereafter UM) and the median expectation for CPI inflation from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia's Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
These measures are intriguing as forecasting tools, as it is highly plausible that, given wage and price stickiness, individuals embed expectations of future infl ation into their price-setting and decision-making behavior today. In fact, if you've read or listened to a Federal Reserve offi cial lately, chances are you've probably heard something to the effect of "…infl ation expectations matter." Indeed, central bankers' sensitivity to infl ation expectations seems warranted, as it is theoretically possible that expectations can be self-fulfi lling prophecies. However, we are mainly interested in the forecasting properties of these measures here.
Just as we do for the alternative measures of infl ation, we incorporate the two measures of infl ation expectations into our two basic models. The regression uses the current median expectation as an explanatory variable, and the naïve specifi cations simply assume the median expectation will be the future year-ahead rate of infl ation.
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Which Gives the Best Forecast? Table 2 details the RMSEs for the different specifi cations, reporting only the highest-performing measures from each type of additional variable (economic activity, core infl ation, and infl ation expectations) to save space. Economic Activity. As was the case with the specifi cations that just depended on past infl ation, the forecasting performance of activity measures varies markedly over time. Moreover, the inclusion of activity measures, particularly the annualized quarterly growth rate in real GDP, seemed to improve upon the specifi cations that depend just on past infl ation only from the 1970s to the 1990s. For the 1970s, Median year-ahead infl ation expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters also tend to forecast relatively well, compared to other specifi cations we tested…and thank goodness! It might be a little embarrassing if professional forecasters, who not only employ more sophisticated infl ation forecasting models than we've investigated here but also have years of experience to shape their judgment, ended up with relatively poor forecasts. That said, the naïve UM forecast did outperform the naive SPF forecast from 1984 to 2006, though that difference was negligible. However, infl ation was relatively stable over that time period, and that could be driving those results. Perhaps more importantly, by including the most recent data that encompass the 2007-09 recession (a relatively volatile time period for headline CPI infl ation), the RMSE for the naïve SPF forecast is about 15 percent more accurate than the forecast from the naïve University of Michigan specifi cation.
Conclusion
While this exercise was rather simple, it did yield some interesting results. First, there doesn't seem to be a single specifi cation that outperforms all others over all time periods. Second, "naïve" specifi cations (other than the naïve forecast using the headline CPI) seem to perform well compared to simple statistical models, and during some periods, forecast signifi cantly better. For example, the naïve forecasts from the median and 16 percent trimmed-mean measures outperform all other specifi cations during the 1990s.
Finally, infl ation expectations appear to forecast future infl ation rather well, yielding the lowest RMSE in every time period for which we have data but one. Over some time periods, especially during the 1980s, a signifi cant infl ection point for infl ation, expectations-based specifi cations forecast exceedingly well relative to the other specifications we tested.
